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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David B. Myers appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction 
relief after an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Myers pied guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. (R., p. 103.) He 
filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting several claims, including a claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion to suppress 
evidence. (R., pp. 3-10.) The district court granted his motion for appointment of 
counsel, and appointed counsel filed an amended petition. (R., pp. 11-14, 20-21, 
38-45.) The matter proceeded to evidentiary hearing. (R., pp. 80-82.) The 
district court denied the petition, concluding that a timely-filed motion for 
suppression would have been denied on the merits. (R., pp. 103-12.) Myers 
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 114-16.) Although the district court 
appointed counsel to represent Myers on appeal (R., p. 119), appellate counsel's 
motion to withdraw was granted (Motion for Leave to Withdraw (filed on or about 
2/13/13); Order Granting Motion for Leave to Withdraw (entered 3/11/13)). 
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ISSUE 
Has Myers failed to demonstrate error in the district court's determination 
that his counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a timely motion to suppress 
because such a motion would not have been granted? 
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ARGUMENT 
Myers Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Factual Findings, And 
Therefore Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that the following factual findings would have 
been made upon Myers' motion for suppression of evidence: 
On January 21, 2010 Caldwell Police Officer Brockbank made a 
routine traffic stop and spoke to a woman he identified as "Komp." 
Komp provided information to Brockbank about criminal activity at 
201 ½ Blaine Street in Caldwell. Komp said she drove from 
Payette to that residence just a few minutes before being stopped 
by Brockbank, and dropped off two men at the residence. The two 
men told Komp they [were] going there to see "Dave" about trading 
some appliances for drugs. Additionally, a month earlier, 
Brockbank received information from other detectives that the same 
residence was being used for "fencing" stolen property. Brockbank 
had also checked a license plate of a car parked at the residence 
and found that it was registered to a woman with an outstanding 
felony warrant who was in fact later located on the property after 
Petitioner was arrested. 
Brockbank, along with Officer Hoadley, went to the 
residence to investigate. The property had a home, and in the back 
yard there was a camp trailer. They first approached the trailer and 
knocked on the door. Petitioner opened the door. Brockbank told 
Petitioner that he was there to investigate possible criminal activity 
and asked if they could come in and talk about it. At that point, 
Petitioner stepped back and made a gesture with his arm allowing 
Brockbank into the trailer. The Court notes that Petitioner has at 
times denied this, but the Court finds that Petitioner's account is not 
credible. Petitioner's attorney concedes that Brockbank's initial 
entry was consensual. 
Next, Brockbank asked Petitioner for identification and 
Petitioner removed his wallet and handed his identification to 
Brockbank, who then stepped out to radio the information to 
dispatch for a records check. The Court notes that Petitioner does 
not raise the issue of whether this was a reasonable investigative 
detention. When Brockbank stepped out, Officer Hoadley stepped 
into the threshold of the trailer to keep an eye on Petitioner. 
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Hoadley asked for permission to search the trailer, and Petitioner 
unequivocally refused, stating he knew his rights and did not have 
to let them search. Petitioner never at any time asked or told either 
officer to step out of the trailer or leave his property. Hoadley then 
made small talk with Petitioner while waiting for Brockbank to finish 
his discussion with dispatch. Hoadley had previous contacts with 
Petitioner and believed him to be a convicted felon. Hoadley noted 
that the interior of the trailer was cluttered with items and there was 
a small area in the back of the trailer behind a corner and some 
boxes that he could not see into, but appeared to be large enough 
to hide an individual. Hoadley asked if there was anyone else in 
the trailer and Petitioner said no. Hoadley asked if he could just 
walk to the back of the trailer to make sure no one was hiding there. 
At that point, although the evidence is conflicting, the Court finds 
that Petitioner affirmatively nodded to Hoadley, Petitioner stepped 
aside to allow Hoadley access, and Petitioner asked Hoadley to not 
scare the cat. 
When Hoadley went to the back of the trailer, he saw a 
shotgun shell and the handgun in plain view. Shortly thereafter, 
[the officers] confirmed that Petitioner was a convicted felon who 
was prohibited from possessing handguns and arrested him for that 
crime. 
(R., pp. 107-08.) Based on these facts, the district court concluded that 
"Petitioner gave voluntary consent" to Officer Hoadley to enter the trailer to 
confirm there were no other persons present. (R., p. 111.) Because Myers gave 
voluntary consent, the "motion to suppress would have been denied." (Id.) On 
this basis, the district court rejected Myers' claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
On appeal Myers claims, but has failed to show, error by the district court. 
(Appellant's brief.) 
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B. Standard of Review 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based. 
I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A 
trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled 
to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. 
App. 1990). Further, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to 
the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial court. Rueth v. State, 
103 Idaho 74,644 P.2d 1333 (1982). 
C. Because The Suppression Motion Would Have Been Denied Regardless, 
Myers Failed To Prove Any Preiudice From The Failure To File A Timely 
Suppression Motion 
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based. 
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135,141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92 
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). A petitioner seeking relief 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must prove "that his counsel was 
deficient in his performance and that this deficiency resulted in prejudice." 
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing 
State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,776 P.2d 424 (1989)). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 
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1999). Where, as here, the allegedly deficient performance was failure to file a 
suppression motion, the petitioner has failed to prove prejudice if the motion 
would not have been granted. Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P .2d 634, 
637 (Ct. App. 1993); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 407, 775 P.2d 1243, 1249 
(Ct. App. 1989). 
The district court's conclusion that the suppression motion would not have 
been granted was correct. Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement 
and justifies entry into a home. State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522, 716 P.2d 
1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 695, 978 P.2d 881, 883 (Ct. 
App. 1999); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 
1998). Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 
852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). The voluntariness of an individual's consent is a 
question of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances. 
~ at 848, 852, 26 P.3d at 35; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 
218, 225-226 (1973)). The district court's factual finding that Myers gave 
voluntary consent for Detective Hoadley to enter the home is dispositive of 
Myers' ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it disproves the prejudice 
element of that claim. 
On appeal Myers asserts he in fact did not give voluntary consent. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 2-3.) He has failed, however, to articulate or demonstrate 
how the evidence before the district court, once the trial court resolved conflicts 
in the evidence on the basis of credibility of the witnesses, did not support the 
district court's factual findings. Myers also argues that officers lacked probable 
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or other legal cause to enter the trailer to conduct a protective sweep. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) However, because the district court concluded that the 
suppression motion would have been denied based on application of the consent 
exception, application of the protective sweep exception is rendered moot. 
Myers failed to show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's failure 
to timely bring the suppression motion that the outcome of his criminal case 
would have been any different. The district court therefore properly denied his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
and judgment denying Myers' petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 26th day of August, 2013. 
ETH K. JORG 
Deputy Attorney Ge 
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